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Abstract In this paper the Virtual Private Ad Hoc Network-
ing (VPAN) platform is introduced as an integrated network-
ing solution for many applications that require secure trans-
parent continuous connectivity using heterogeneous devices
and network technologies. This is done by creating a virtual
logical self-organizing network on top of existing network
technologies reducing complexity and maintaining session
continuity right from the start. One of the most interesting
applications relies in the field of emergency communication
with its specific needs which will be discussed in this paper
and matched in detail against the architecture and features of
the VPAN platform. The concept and dynamics are demon-
strated and evaluated with measurements done on real hard-
ware.
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1 Introduction
For National Security and Public Safety (NSPS) workers, a
special purpose communication network is necessary with
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its special requirements. For emergency workers, a perma-
nent connection enabling voice and data communication, is
a prerequisite for a successful mission. The Internet, which
is nowadays becoming a large “network of networks” with
its broad spectrum of different wired, wireless and mobile
communications and technologies, offers ubiquitous connec-
tivity. Nevertheless, it may be clear that this large-scale com-
munication network is not directly suitable for emergency
applications as the secure interconnection of a selected set
of distributed and often mobile devices over this network
requires technological skills and very precious configura-
tion and management time. Reducing this configuration and
management complexity must be a key feature of our com-
munication platform.
In this paper we will first highlight in section 2 some key
features that NSPS-communication systems and emergency
applications require and illustrate this with a simple sce-
nario. In 3, an overview of the most important related work
in emergency communication as well as overlay network-
ing and other enabling protocols is given revealing there are
no integrated solutions that tackle all requirements at the
same time. Our platform, based on network virtualization,
provides this integrated solution and is briefly presented in
section 4. To validate this architecture, a proof-of-concept
implementation has been built of which a summary is given
in section 5. This implementation is evaluated with some
performance measurements on real hardware in section 6. A
critical evaluation of these results and an evaluation against
the requirements is given in section 7, next to some primary
points of interest for future work.
2 Emergency communication requirements
In emergency situations, time is crucial. Especially during
the golden hour, every gained minute can save many lives.
2So efficient communication and data exchange is of great
importance. A continuous communication platform provid-
ing voice and data allows emergency workers to agree on
intervention strategies while on the road, thereby viewing
intervention plans and updated stock lists of eventual dan-
gerous goods on a mobile device. Permanent updates of a
dynamic geographical information system (GIS) and crisis
management systems as developed in the GeoBIPS [3] and
ADAMO [2] projects enrich this data exchange and pro-
vide the authorities with concise and exact information in
real-time. Support for non-interactive data communications
is a basic requirement also requested by the SAFECOM pro-
gram [11] of the US Dept. of Homeland Security.
Upon arrival on site, this communication platform must
allow very fast deployment to all individual emergency work-
ers, providing instant ad-hoc usage. No time may be lost
setting up complex infrastructures. We cannot expect emer-
gency workers to have any technical knowledge, nor do they
have time to handle network configuration on their devices.
Their only focus is the intervention itself. Therefore, ease-
of-use is of prime importance.
A first group is sent out to explore the site. Permanent
reliable communication with this group, as well as other
team members on-site, stays crucial. Our network, growing
in space as team members get scattered on location, must
be able to handle mobility without manual device configura-
tions. Self-organization, self-maintenance, self-optimization
and self-healing capabilities are necessary. When coverage
gets lost, additional communication equipment must be setup,
again without technical knowledge or user administration.
Also here, communication and data exchange is important to
provide other team members and especially the command-
ing officer with a good view of the situation. Streaming video
capabilities can be of great help. The fast setup of this addi-
tional deployed infrastructure is even more important when,
like with the hurricane Katrina, lots of wireless base stations,
cables and central offices are destroyed and one can only
rely on the ad hoc network.
Over time, the needs of the emergency network evolve.
In the very first phase, rapid deployment, using highly porta-
ble, small, lightweight equipment by non-technical users is a
key requirement. In this phase most communication is voice-
based between the end-user and the headquarters (HQ), while
also initial access to the emergency management applica-
tion is necessary. However, in a second phase, cooperation
gains importance as other teams get involved. Command-
ing officers (CO) need permanent communication lines with
their colleagues as well as their team members, without both
groups getting mixed or overwhelmed with information that
was not destined for them. Different fenced but inter-operable
communication groups are necessary. [36] recalls the impor-
tance of these interoperability requirements as illustrated in
previous events like the 9/11 attacks where radio commu-
nications were a lifeline for the hundreds of police officers
who received the word to evacuate the building and all but
60 of them escaped. Tragically, hundreds of New York fire-
fighters did not receive that warning because they were us-
ing a different radio communications system, with the well
known consequences.
Increased activities demand for increased access to the
emergency management application and thus a higher band-
width [11]. Todays private mobile radio (PMR) networks
like TETRA [42] can provide adequate service when there
are a few users, but when there are many, these applications
can block all other communication. Therefore we must be
able to use and combine different available network tech-
nologies, like WiFi, GPRS, UMTS, HSPA, (mobile) Wi-
MAX, satellite, LTE [19] or even an Ethernet or DSL con-
nection from a nearby building. Compatibility with upcom-
ing technologies like LTE Advanced must be kept in mind.
Of course, the emergency communication platform must
be flexible and future proof in order to support different
kinds of applications, like voice, video, document sharing,
etc. No restrictions on the application level are allowed. This
also counts for the used devices where a great heterogeneity
must be taken into account. Regular computers must be sup-
ported as well as laptops, tablet PCs, smartphones, servers,
etc.
Last but not least: security is a key requirement. Emer-
gency communication should be shielded from other appli-
cations using the same shared medium. Not only to reduce
configuration complexity and information overwhelming to
other present teams, but in the first place to protect the inter-
vention and all involved parties from intrusion or informa-
tion leakage. Eavesdropping paparazzi or sabotage through
the used communication platform must be made impossible.
From the above description, we can summarize the fol-
lowing basic requirements:
– Membership configuration and management: only cer-
tain people (further called members) may have access to
the provided emergency services
– Ease of use and fast ad hoc deployment: reduce technical
complexity to avoid losing time. Assume users may not
have technical knowledge and have other priorities.
– Local and distributed operation: devices in each other’s
neighborhood should be able to communicate securely
without infrastructure. Using the Internet and heteroge-
neous access technologies, distributed members should
be automatically and securely interconnected.
– Security: access to the network based on membership,
application and service access rights and secure data trans-
port. As such, security mechanisms for trust, encryption,
authentication and authorization are indispensable.
– Self-organization and mobility management: connectiv-
ity and session continuity should be guaranteed regard-
3less of member mobility, topology changes or access
network changes.
– Application support: users (or network managers) should
be able to specify to which applications, services, data...
the users in the NSPS network have access. Additionally,
support for all kinds of applications is required.
– Scalability: depending on the scenario, the number of
members can become quite large, making scalability a
potential issue that has to be taken care of.
– Heterogeneity: a wide spectrum of devices should be
supported, as well as different access networks and tech-
nologies
3 Related work
A lot of research has already been done in the area of NSPS
networking and will be matched here against our require-
ments.
3.1 TETRA, TEDS and MVNO
Emergency servants in lots of countries use their own TETRA-
based network. This TErrestrial Trunked RAdio [42] system
(standard proposed by ETSI) is a digital solution built upon
a private mobile radio (PMR) system. TETRA provides spe-
cialized safety services, direct mode operation, voice en-
cryption, all informed net group calls and a wide range of
data services over a wide area. However, even TETRA 2 re-
lease with its TETRA Enhanced Data Services (TEDS) has
a very limited (downlink) bandwidth theoretically ranging
from 15.6 kbps (DQPSK modulation over a 25 kHz chan-
nel) up to 538 kbps using 64-QAM over a 150 kHz chan-
nel. This prevents enriched information streams such as live
video from inside a crisis situation or even frequent database
consulting. Also the private aspect of the system prevents
coupling with public networks.
Creating a secure mobile virtual network operator (MVNO)
using todays 3GPP-based mobile broadband networks is an
alternative to TETRA promoted by operators and technol-
ogy companies like Ericsson in white papers like [23], pri-
mary focused on the higher bandwidth and general (IP-)
compatibility. However, other requirements as listed in sec-
tion 2, like local ad hoc optimizations, are not met. Also
this infrastructure can be demolished in certain situations, so
we really need fast deployment of own local infrastructures.
However, when available, it must be possible to use this net-
work as one possible access network to support emergency
communication.
3.2 (Proxy) Mobile IPv6 - Host Identity Protocol - NEMO
In [29], Iapichino et al. propose a combination of Proxy Mo-
bile IPv6 (PMIPv6) 3.2 and Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
in order to combine mobility and heterogeneous networking
for emergency management. This is based on their previ-
ously proposed unmodified IPv6 approach [30] with locally
deployed mobile ad hoc mesh networks interconnected by
satellite using vehicle communication gateways. This very
interesting architecture allows public safety users to use the
different technologies of their multi-homed devices while
supporting session continuity. Intra and inter-technology han-
dovers are calculated to be very efficient occurring low la-
tency.
However, other crucial requirements are not met. No trusted
secure environment is created. There is no possibility of group-
ing a selected set of devices in a shielded environment but
still allowing other NSPS organizations to use the commu-
nication infrastructure as base layer without getting mixed
up.
In that respect it is also worth to mention other mobil-
ity management related work such as Mobile IP [39,31] and
NEMO. NEMO [4] is a solution concerned with managing
the mobility of an entire network that changes its point of
attachment to the Internet in a way that is completely trans-
parent to the nodes inside the mobile network. Issues such as
route optimizations and security are also considered. These
solutions provide interesting mechanisms to manage mobil-
ity of nodes and networks with respect to all other nodes
in the Internet and concepts could be applied to the man-
agement of the mobility of distributed members in an inte-
grated emergency communication framework. Of course, it
is clear that the scope of these solutions is also far too limit-
ing with regard to aspects such as membership management,
ad hoc routing, infrastructure-less communication, provid-
ing a shielded environment for network members.
3.3 WiMAX backbone and grid computing
In [15], Chiti et al. present a wireless infrastructure based
on a WiMAX interconnecting backbone and local wireless
ad-hoc (IEEE 802.11x) and sensor networks for coverage
extension and monitoring purposes. This architecture is es-
pecially interesting for connectivity roll-out in and monitor-
ing of bigger areas without (or with destroyed) infrastructure
avoiding satellite-like round trip times. Some issues (like the
need for distributed authentication) are identified. Fantacci
et al. go a step further in [24] integrating the (same) com-
munication infrastructure and the processing layer as a grid,
proposing the ASSISTANT programming model.
While [15] focuses mostly on the establishment of a lo-
cal communication infrastructure, we think the roll-out of a
4secure network for emergency workers offering connectivity
to all involved actors must be the main issue.
3.4 Overlay-like networking techniques
Realization of secure communication between all involved
actors in an emergency setting has similarities with the cre-
ation of logical groupings of devices. Therefore we discuss
here some networking techniques that allow the creation of
such logical groups and match them against the requirements.
– VLANs [25]: a virtual LAN is the logical grouping of a
subset of devices belonging to an Ethernet system which
appear to be on a separate LAN.
– VPNs [10,7,32]: a VPN is a private data network that
makes use of an underlying communication network (eg.
the Internet) to securely connect two sites or add a (mo-
bile) client to a site. An interesting solution is offered
by Hamachi [1]: a centrally managed solution for di-
rect peer-to-peer VPNs with an open security architec-
ture and NAT-to-NAT traversal capabilities.
– P2P application overlays [22,34]: in P2P application level
overlays, applications running on distributed systems cre-
ate logical links between each other using native Inter-
net routing and standard IP addresses. The result is a
self-organizing semantic layer above the basic transport
protocol level.
These solutions only tackle one specific aspect, but fail to
tackle other requirements. VLANs are limited to one Ether-
net environment, while VPNs are too static for dynamic en-
vironments which emergency scenarios definitely are. VPNs
may be set up from every location, but there is no mobility
management, no session continuity and some solutions even
put limitations on the application level. There is also no lo-
cal ad hoc organization possible. P2P-overlays may be more
self-organizing but these only run on top of an operational
network and are limited to the application and its services:
the overlay cannot be used by other applications. It may be
clear that the above techniques all have their limitations and
do not meet the requirements as stated in 2.
3.5 Conclusion
This state-of-the-art overview reveals that, although exist-
ing solutions partially can meet the requirements, none of
them is capable to tackle all requirements. Simply combin-
ing a number of these solutions is also too limiting in order
to meet all requirements. This motivates the design of an in-
tegrated solution that tackles all these requirements and will
be subject of the remainder of this paper.
4 VPAN architecture as an integrated solution
As stated in the introduction, the Internet is not directly suit-
able for emergency applications due to its complexity to
securely interconnect distributed groups of devices. How-
ever, emergency scenarios do not need this complex Inter-
net as such. As discussed in the requirements section, they
just need a permanent secure connection between a dynamic
subset of distributed and mobile devices with a limited num-
ber of crucial applications, using the available (heteroge-
neous) infrastructure, appended with their own infrastruc-
ture.
Therefore, we see interesting opportunities in the ex-
pected evolution towards network virtualization, where a log-
ical structure is built on top of these base networks [14,
13]. Such small and secure logical overlay networks, group-
ing the previously mentioned subset of devices and mak-
ing the underlying base network invisible, create a shielded
and trusted environment for their participants. Enhancing
them with ad hoc protocols and techniques can result in self-
creating, self-organizing and self-administering communi-
ties on top of existing network infrastructures, drastically
reducing complexity so their users can focus on their main
task: the emergency intervention.
The Virtual Private Ad Hoc Networking (VPAN) plat-
form as described in [27] and [26] is developed with these
key insights as main drive. It is based on the creation of
virtual overlay networks consisting of selected subsets of
permanently connected trusted devices. Nodes in an over-
lay network or VPAN can be thought of as being connected
by virtual or logical links. These virtual links correspond to
a path in the underlying network, perhaps through multiple
physical links. Such an overlay network drastically reduces
size (in terms of connected devices) and complexity. Partic-
ipating devices can join multiple overlay networks. In each
VPAN, a node can share selected services or resources. A
graphical illustration of the VPAN concept is given in Fig. 1
and is further explained in the following paragraphs.
All devices participating in an overlay network must share
a common cryptographic trust relationship which must be
installed in advance or can be added on the fly.
Based on this trust relationship, neighboring devices (i.e.
devices having link layer connectivity) can discover and au-
thenticate each other and establish subsequent short-term
link-level security associations. This process is called neigh-
bor detection and is illustrated in Fig. 2.a. All members that
only rely on trusted nodes for their communication form
a cluster. Internally, this cluster uses private VPAN IP ad-
dresses and ad hoc routing over the secured links, result-
ing in a fully secured and self-organizing network, poten-
tially using different heterogeneous networking technolo-
gies (WiFi, Bluetooth, Ethernet...).
5Fig. 1 The VPAN concept.
Fig. 2 VPAN creation: a. Neighbor discovery; b. Cluster registration;
c. Tunnel negotiation
Next, clusters on different geographical locations dis-
cover each other’s point(s) of attachment to the Internet with
the help of a VPAN Agent (see Fig. 2.b). This informa-
tion is then used to dynamically establish secure tunnels
between the clusters, again including authentication of the
gateway nodes between which the tunnels are established
(see Fig. 2.c). Again the underlying technology does not
matter, as long as it is IP capable (WiFi, WiMax, TETRA,
UMTS, GPRS, HSXPA, LTE,...).
At this point, any member in the VPAN network can se-
curely communicate with any other member using the in-
ternally fixed private IP addresses. Mechanisms to handle
member mobility, changes in network interfaces, link breaks,
changes in the point of attachment to the Internet... ensure
that connectivity is maintained between all VPAN members
in a way that is transparent to the applications running in the
VPAN network. Also cluster-wide and VPAN-wide broad-
casting is supported. A service announcement and discov-
ery protocol enables service sharing, discovery and usage.
Finally, API’s are provided to monitor the network and re-
trieve status information.
To summarize the aspect of virtualization, each physical
node that is member of a VPAN becomes available in the
resulting virtual network as one virtual node. Physical (L2)
links between trusted nodes become virtual direct (secured)
links. Virtual tunnels at their turn can be mapped on a L3
path consisting out of multiple physical links and physical
(non-trusted) nodes, between two physical IP endpoints. On
each physical node which is a VPAN member, a virtual IP
adapter is created. All communication through this adapter
is encrypted, translated and sent into the virtual network as
with traditional VPN solutions.
This integrated approach makes the platform generally
usable in a wide range of applications like healthcare [28],
machine-to-machine communication [9], personal network-
ing grouping all your devices, education, public transport
company networking, enterprise networking grouping col-
laborating people etc. This paper however focuses in detail
on its implementation and its application in emergency net-
working and its performance in these highly dynamic envi-
ronments.
5 VPAN implementation summary
In this section the building blocks are explained while focus-
ing on their functionality and their cooperation in the frame-
work. The used protocols are not treated in detail but further
references are given.
5.1 Establishment of a Trust Relationship
A Virtual Private Ad Hoc Network is established between
VPAN members that have a common trust relationship. This
common trust relationship is established through the use of
certificates. Every VPAN member has a private key, a mem-
ber certificate (a public key signed with a private key com-
mon to the VPAN) and a common VPAN certificate. Also,
every VPAN member has a unique VPAN ID. Finally, all
VPAN members have a signed common VPAN profile that
contains general information about the VPAN (such as the
VPAN IP addressing space, VPAN Agent IP...) and a signed
member profile that contains member specific settings such
6as the device name, user name.... At this moment, the gen-
eration and installation of the certificates and profiles can be
done through a web portal, but of course this can also be
done remotely by a network administrator.
5.2 Neighbor discovery
VPAN members sharing such a common trust relationship
that are able to connect to each other without using not-
trusted nodes, organize themselves in clusters during a clus-
ter formation process. Therefore, beacons are periodically
broadcasted over all Personal Area Network (PAN) inter-
faces, interfaces that are used for establishing direct connec-
tions with neighboring VPAN members. Upon reception of
a beacon of another VPAN member, a three-way challenge-
response session takes place, resulting in mutual authentica-
tion using their member certificates and private keys, storage
of all link information and the exchange of short-term uni-
cast and broadcast session keys. These short-term keys are
then used to encrypt all further communication using sym-
metric encryption, resulting in a secure communication link.
The link information makes the use of ARPmessages redun-
dant. For the creation of the certificates and the implementa-
tion of the security protocols, the OpenSSL library [44,17]
has been used. In order to enable network connectivity be-
tween the IP-capable VPAN members within the same clus-
ter, address assignment and routing capabilities are needed
that can deal with these ad hoc characteristics.
5.3 Addressing
We have adopted a flat addressing scheme, in which each
VPAN member receives one unique VPAN IP address, in-
dependent of the number of underlying network interfaces.
This address consists of a VPAN prefix, which is part of the
common VPAN profile, followed by a Node Identifier that
uniquely identifies each VPAN member within the VPAN.
Address assignment is realized through the use of an au-
tomatic address assignment protocol. Initially, the address
is generated automatically by the VPAN member. A dupli-
cate address detection mechanism ensures that the gener-
ated address is unique within an isolated cluster. When the
cluster is able to communicate with the VPAN Agent (see
further), the generated addresses are verified by the VPAN
Agent for uniqueness within the entire VPAN. Once the ad-
dresses have been verified centrally, in the VPAN Agent for
their uniqueness, the same (or another in case of a dupli-
cate address) address will be reused for the remainder of the
lifetime of the VPAN member in the VPAN, avoiding addi-
tional addressing overhead. In addition, when clusters merge
or split, no address reassignments or complex duplicate ad-
dress detection procedures are needed. As a consequence,
this addressing scheme has the advantage that it incurs only
a one-time overhead until verification has taken place.
5.4 Intra-cluster Routing
As a flat addressing scheme does not reveal any information
on the location of the node within the VPAN, this problem
has to be solved by the proposed VPAN-wide routing pro-
tocol. Since a VPAN is inherently a hierarchical network,
i.e. groups of nodes forming clusters that are interconnected
over the Internet, we exploited this by developing a hierar-
chical VPAN routing protocol, separating intra-cluster and
inter-cluster routing. As clusters are self-organizing and self-
maintaining, properties that can also be found in ad hoc
routing protocols, it is a natural choice to integrate an ad
hoc routing protocol into the architecture to fulfill the intra-
cluster routing functionality. We have chosen to adopt a flex-
ible multi-mode approach for the intra-cluster routing com-
ponent in our solution, offering both proactive and reactive
intra-cluster routing. The desired type of routing can be de-
fined in the common VPAN profile.
5.5 Dynamic Tunneling
After cluster formation, the clusters can have access to the
infrastructure through their VPAN gateway nodes, locate each
other and establish secure tunnels between each other. The
functionality for finding the location of the other remote
clusters is offered by a VPAN Agent. Currently, we assume
that the VPAN Agent is a centralized server that is always
online and reachable through its public IP address or DNS
name. VPAN gateway nodes securely register with their VPAN
Agent to which they will establish a tunnel, revealing their
physical location. At the same time, the presence and type
of Network Address (Port) Translation (NA(P)T) boxes is
discovered. This information is communicated to all other
VPAN gateway nodes that have registered, providing them
with an up-to-date view of all other remote clusters, and
is then used to proactively, i.e. immediately after registra-
tion of a new VPAN gateway node, or reactively, i.e. when
communication with a VPAN member in a remote cluster
is needed, establish tunnels. As such, the establishment of
these tunnels can take place proactively or on demand. Again,
this is defined in the common VPAN profile. This results in
a virtual overlay network that encompasses all VPAN mem-
bers. By default, IPSec tunneling, applying both encryption
and encapsulation, is used. However, in case one or multiple
VPAN gateway nodes are behind NA(P)T, IPSec over UDP
is used. In case both gateway nodes are behind NA(P)T, hole
punching is used to go through the NA(P)T boxes. If no
direct tunnel can be established, traffic is tunneled via the
VPAN Agent.
75.6 Inter-cluster Routing
Similar to the multi-mode solution for intra-cluster routing,
we have adopted a multi-mode approach for the inter-cluster
routing component of the VPAN routing protocol, allow-
ing both proactive and reactive inter-cluster routing. The de-
sired routing and tunneling types are defined in the common
VPAN profile. Further, since inter-cluster forwarding takes
place over tunnels, the inter-cluster routing protocol does
not make use of next hop information as traditional rout-
ing protocols do, but uses tunnel identifiers. In addition, a
gateway discovery and selection mechanism (see further) is
implemented. Finally, next to unicast functionality, 1-hop,
cluster-wide and VPAN-wide broadcasting functionality is
offered.
5.7 Universal Convergence Layer and Interface
Management
We already stated that, at the network level, a VPAN is an
overlay network in which every VPANmember has a unique
VPAN IP address independent of the number of interfaces
and independent of any other IP addresses that are already
assigned to these interfaces. Apart from the fact that a de-
vice can have multiple interfaces, we also need to discrimi-
nate between two types of interfaces, namely Personal Area
Network (PAN) interfaces and Wide Area Network (WAN)
interfaces. PAN interfaces are interfaces that are used for di-
rect communication with neighboring VPAN members (e.g.
WLAN, Bluetooth...). WAN interfaces are interfaces that are
used to connect to a public network like the Internet (e.g.
Ethernet, WLAN, UMTS...). Of course, some types of inter-
faces (e.g. WLAN) can be used at the same time as PAN and
WAN interface. Also, interfaces can be added or removed
dynamically for use by a VPAN member. To this end, a uni-
versal convergence layer (UCL) [41] is needed that manages
the complexity, characteristics and heterogeneity of the un-
derlying interfaces and the dynamic addition and removal of
them, thereby providing a uniform view and interface to the
higher layers.
Further, the status of an interface, such as (wired or wire-
less) connectivity to an access point or the (re)assignment
of a (public) IP address, can change during the use of the
interface and has an impact on other VPAN components
(for instance the management of mobility, optimization of
link break detection...). Therefore, an event-based interface
manager listens to NETLINK events sent out by the kernel,
indicating changes in the interfaces or routing tables, and
handles them to maintain the VPAN overlay. As such, any
dynamics taking place within the VPAN can be taken care
of, thereby guaranteeing the VPAN connectivity. This also
speeds up some processes, like the neighbor detection where
an additional beacon is sent after a new interface comes up,
or removal of a link when a cable is unplugged. Finally,
interfaces have different properties in terms of bandwidth,
cost, security... which are taken into account in order to op-
timize the VPAN communication according to user prefer-
ences.
5.8 Gateway discovery
As a cluster can consist of multiple gateways, an intelligent
choice should be made selecting the right gateway. Even
more: gateways can have multiple WAN-interfaces with all
different characteristics like bandwidth, delay, cost, QoS,
energy usages,... Therefore a gateway discovery mechanism
has been implemented.When a node joins the cluster and the
proactive routing protocol is used, all gateways announce
their availability and the characteristics of their available
WAN-interfaces in the cluster. When hopcount is the used
metric, packets for nodes in a remote cluster are sent to the
next hop on the path towards the nearest gateway. When
other metrics, like cost or energy, are used, the packet is en-
capsulated in another IP-packet with the selected gateway as
destination. Upon arrival at the gateway, the packet is decap-
sulated and sent to the remote gateway. As gateway selection
is done by the individual nodes, encapsulation is necessary
to prevent bouncing when two nodes select another gateway.
5.9 Integrated security mechanisms: summary
As stated in the definition of a VPAN in section 4, security is
a key element of the platform, integrated in all components
and mechanisms. Using a public key infrastructure (PKI) ev-
ery node is equipped with an X.509 certificate and a private
key and the public key of the certification authority (CA) for
this particular VPAN. All certificates are signed using the
private key of the CA. In the current implementation, a key
length of 1024 bits is used. This allows all nodes to authen-
ticate each other and establish temporary secure communi-
cation channels over which symmetric pairwise keys are ex-
changed. This approach is applied to the neighbor detection
process and the tunnel establishment process as described
in 5.2 and 9. Next, all data traffic being sent in the over-
lay is encrypted using the much faster symmetric cryptog-
raphy. In our implementation, a 160-bit SHA-1 digest and
replay counter are added, after which the whole packet is
encrypted using a 128-bit AES-key. This is all done using
the well-known OpenSSL library.
5.10 Implementation
Currently, a proof-of-concept version of the VPAN-software
has been built for different operating systems including Li-
nux, Mac OS X and Windows as well as Maemo, which is a
8Linux variant for the Nokia Internet tablets. Also a version
for the Neo Freerunner smartphone is available.
The implementation of the above described building blocks
is done in the Click Modular Router framework [33]. Click
is a software architecture for building flexible and config-
urable routers, but can be used for implementing any net-
work level packet processing functionality. Next to this, a
rudimentary GUI and a complete local and remote API are
developed allowing status and statistics retrieval as well as
full configurability of the running overlays.
The software has been deployed and tested on a testbed
consisting of multiple clusters, multiple overlay networks,
access points and different access networks for a wide range
of setups and parameter values. Details can be found in [26].
The used routing protocols are tested on a simulator as well.
Currently, the software is being tested on a real large scale
using the Virtual Wall [6] and Wireless lab of the i-Lab.t
Technology Center [5] at IBBT. Results and details of per-
formance measurements of the current implementation are
given in section 6.
6 Performance of the proof of concept implementation
In this section most important aspects of the current proof
of concept implementation will be evaluated for a number
of aspects. First of all we will measure the additional de-
lay introduced by the VPAN middleware: how long does it
take to send a packet from one node to another node due
to the additional packet processing of the VPAN platform?
The used metric therefore is the RTT averaged over 60 ping
requests during one minute with packets of 1400 bytes. This
is done for intra-cluster as well as inter-cluster traffic in two
scenarios. Also the maximum throughput (for intra-cluster
traffic as well as inter-cluster traffic) is measured for both
TCP and UDP traffic. Regarding UDP-traffic, we measured
the maximum bandwidths without observed packet loss, un-
less mentioned otherwise. For these throughput tests, we
will talk about TUN-traffic, which is the VPAN traffic sent
by the application to the private VPAN IP and thus using
the TUN virtual network interface. The impact of the plat-
form on the CPU (measured relative to the maximum pos-
sible CPU load) for a set of data bandwidths will also be
evaluated in these scenarios. For inter-cluster traffic, local
Ethernet connections as well as commercial available Inter-
net connections are used. Next, the overhead of additional
packets for cluster formation, addressing and gateway se-
lection will be discussed. Of course, as self-organization and
mobility-management is a key feature, the ability of the plat-
form to cope with changing topologies will be thoroughly
evaluated. For this aspect, we will measure how long it takes
to detect these changes, how fast packets are re-routed to
their destination and how many packets are lost (in queues)
due to these changes. Different kinds of topology changes
will be investigated. Therefore, each used scenario will be
introduced further in this chapter.
6.1 VPAN software overhead
As already stated, the networking components of the VPAN
software have been developed in Click Router, running in
user level. All VPAN related traffic is processed by these
Click Router components thereby introducing additional over-
head (e.g. beaconing, routing, encryption,...) compared to
traditional processing by the operating system networking
stack. To this end, we have measured the highest achievable
TCP and UDP throughput and round-trip-time (RTT) for
standard Linux forwarding, VPAN forwarding using encryp-
tion and VPAN without using encryption. Encryption uses
128-bit AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) [18], comple-
mented with a 160-bit SHA1 digest and replay counter using
the OpenSSL [44,17] library.
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Fig. 3 Intra-cluster forwarding performance test setup.
In Fig. 4 the RTT of plain Linux forwarding for a setup
consisting out of 10 interconnected Virtual Wall [6] nodes
(as shown in Fig. 3, using 2 Dual-Core AMD OpteronTM
2212 processors1 running at 2010 MHz with 1 MB cache) is
compared to the RTT of VPAN-forwarding with encryption
turned off and on. We observe that the additional process-
ing of the userlevel Click and flow through the VPAN rout-
ing elements adds nearly 30 % to the normal RTT when not
using encryption. When using hop-by-hop AES-encryption,
another 30 % is added. This is caused by the time needed for
encrypting and decrypting the traffic.
When using automatic TCPwindow scaling, the through-
put, averaged over 10 runs, is limited to 183Mbps (not shown)
for one hop forwarding and a more or less constant 178Mbps
for 2 till 9 hops without using encryption. Encryption lim-
its this further to 105 Mbps and 78 Mbps for 1 and 2 till
9 hops respectively. These values show the limits of the cur-
rent VPAN implementation, but it may be clear that this does
not hinder most applications on normal devices with nor-
mal network bandwidths of, e.g. 54 Mbps for IEEE802.11
wireless networks which will be the real bottlenecks. When
emulating this behavior by applying a fixed TCP-window of
1 Click is single threaded so only one core is used for Click/VPAN
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Fig. 4 Average round-trip-time versus number of hops.
16 kB we get results as shown in Fig. 5 where the achieved
decrease in throughput is due to the increased RTT.
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Fig. 5 Throughput versus number of hops with 16k TCP window, av-
eraged over 10 runs.
The above discussion reveals that the use of hop-by-hop
encryption is probably the most contributing factor to the in-
creased RTT and thus decreased TCP throughput. To verify
this, measurements have been done on the same test setup,
but now both with and without encryption and for unidirec-
tional UDP traffic. As the unidirectional UDP throughput is
now insensitive to the increasing round-trip-time, there is no
decrease in throughput (not shown) when using 100 Mbps
links without encryption: plain Linux forwarding and VPAN
forwarding both deliver a throughput of 97 Mbps. When us-
ing encryption however, this is limited to 91 Mbps. Again,
in normal situations, this will not become a bottleneck.
It may be noted that when using Click Router as a kernel
module with network cards that support polling, forwarding
rates may be achieved that completely outperform moder-
ate Cisco hardware routers on regular hardware [33] of not
even a tenth of the cost of the mentioned Cisco router. So,
when a higher throughput is required for e.g. certain central
application servers, further research can be done on running
VPAN in kernel level and using hardware encryption. Our
research however focuses on supporting VPAN on a broad
spectrum of devices, so no assumptions on the used kernel
can be made for the end user devices.
Of course, running VPAN in user level comes with a cer-
tain cost of additional CPU usage due to context swaps be-
tween the application and the kernel and a more expensive
kernel path when using the universal TUN/TAP-devices. CPU
usage versus requested throughput, on the same hardware as
previously in this section, is shown in Fig. 6 for a node play-
ing the role of forwarding (F) node: accepting packets from
other nodes (S) and sending them out on another interface
to the destination (D) or next node. Different roles also give
different CPU usage, as shown in Fig. 7 for a throughput of
10 Mbps.
In practice, the role of most nodes will be mixed as they
will have incoming as well as outgoing traffic and they may
have a forwarding function as in a wireless mesh on site.
The results of measurements with this kind of mixed traf-
fic are listed in table 1. Symmetric loads as well as a typi-
cal load scenario with only a small part of traffic originating
from or destined for the considered node are given. The CPU
load remains acceptable but some slight packet loss can be
observed with increasing bandwidth. As no packet loss can
be observed for traffic generated by the node, this might be
an implementation issue for which future work is required.
However, we can conclude that additionally placed inter-
mediate nodes, expanding the coverage area of the wireless
mesh network, will be able to support decent bandwidths.
We also made certain that CPU usage remains almost con-
stant during the whole time a constant throughput test is run.
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Fig. 6 CPU usage versus throughput in a forwarding node.
6.2 Cluster Formation
6.2.1 Impact of Beacons
The detection of neighboring VPAN members and the de-
tection of link breaks is done by sending beacons on a pe-
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Fig. 7 CPU usage for sending, forwarding and destination nodes, all
with and without encryption, for a stream of 10 Mbps.
Table 1 CPU load of the middle node and packet loss in a scenario
with 3 nodes on one line and 3 UDP data streams. Flow A streams
from Node 1 to Node 2, B from 2→ 3 and C from 1→ 3.
BW A BW B BW C CPU load Loss Loss Loss
(Mpbs) (Mbps) (Mpbs) (%) A (%) B (%) C (%)
10 10 10 60 0 0 0
20 20 20 77 1.3 0 1.4
30 30 30 91 0.22 0 0.1
40 40 40 98 5.6 0 5.4
10 10 30 57 5.6 0 4.5
riodically base. These beacons are small packets being sent
for every VPAN the node participates in, introducing addi-
tional overhead, especially when wireless links are used. De-
creasing the beacon interval will deliver faster neighbor and
link break detection, but involves more overhead. Also an in-
creasing number of VPANs running on (partly) the same de-
vices, or on devices using the same shared medium, will re-
sult in more beacons being sent. [26] shows that the achiev-
able throughput stays acceptable for beacon intervals above
5 ms for 1 VPAN (where however some false link breaks
will be detected) and 200 ms for up to 10 VPANs. In prac-
tice, the choice of the beacon interval depends on the re-
quested responsiveness of the system. For mobile systems,
an interval between 200 ms and 1000 ms seems reasonable
as link breaks are detected at least after 3.5 times this in-
terval. Increasing performance can be achieved when this
beacon interval can be dynamically adapted to the device
mobility and its moving speed.
6.2.2 Link setup time
Once a VPAN member receives a beacon of a neighboring
VPAN member, a secure link can be established through a
three-way handshake process. This link setup time is ap-
proximately equal to 2 ∗RTT + Tproc for the node sending
the beacon, where RTT is the round-trip-time of the link
and Tproc the time needed for packet processing and cryp-
tography. The node receiving the beacon only has to send
the challenge and awaiting the first response so it takes only
RTT +Tproc for this node to consider the link as established.
The share of each cryptographic step in this time period is
given by Fig. 8. The average time it takes for both neigh-
bors to detect each other is thus equal to 2 ∗RTT +Tproc+
BEACON INTERVAL
4 since both nodes are sending beacons. For
wireless links, the link delay is the largest contributor to the
link setup time.
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Fig. 8 Share of each cryptographic step using 1024-bit RSA.
When triggered by a NETLINK event generated by the
kernel (after e.g. plugging in a cable), measurements show
that the challenge-response session is started within 46 ms.
On a low-powered embedded device (an ALIX system board
[8] with an AMD Geode LX800 CPU running at 500 MHz),
the handshake is completed and the link established after
another 160 ms.
Priority scheduling with priority for control packets pre-
vents these packets to be dropped and thus prevents false
link breaks due to high background traffic. The resulting link
setup time is also much better, but far not as good as the link
setup times that have been achieved for lower bit rate back-
ground streams for the following three reasons.
First of all, this is due to the fact that the network cards
have their own queue. Consequently, the control packets,
although prioritized in VPAN software, will arrive in the
queue on the network card. There, they have to wait until
all other data packets already in this queue have been sent.
Next, it is also possible that there is also non-VPAN traf-
fic. This traffic, together with the traffic sent by the VPAN
software, will, before it arrives at the interface, be aggre-
gated into a queue in the operating system. Finally, when
trying to send the control packet over the wireless medium,
the node still has to contend with other nodes in order to ac-
cess the wireless channel, which can again lead to larger link
setup times when the channel is saturated. In order to solve
these problems, additional priority scheduling mechanisms
at these three levels are needed in order to really prioritize
our VPAN control traffic. With all these mechanisms, link
setup times comparable to those obtained in the absence of
background traffic could become realistic in all scenarios.
6.3 Addressing Overhead
In a cluster that is not registered, some nodes can have an un-
verified address. Such an address is generated by the nodes
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themselves and is not guaranteed to be unique in the clus-
ter. Therefore, nodes that have an unverified address period-
ically announce this address to all other nodes, using blind
flooding, in order to detect duplicate addresses. Upon detec-
tion of an address collision, one of the nodes generates a new
address. This introduces an overhead of NUNVERIFIED∗NTADDRINTERVAL
pack-
ets per second with NUNVERIFIED the number of nodes with
an unverified address, N the total number of nodes in the
cluster (to take into account the blind flooding process) and
TADDRINTERVAL the interval (in seconds) with which the ad-
dressing updates are sent. Once the cluster has registered, all
addresses are verified by the VPAN Agent. From that point
on, the nodes continue to use their verified address as long
as they remain a member of the VPAN and consequently,
NUNVERIFIED, and thus the addressing overhead, becomes
equal to 0.
6.4 Tunneling
For the tunneling of the inter-cluster traffic a number of pos-
sibilities exist. By default, IPSec tunneling is used to encrypt
and encapsulate the packets. Since encryption is a time con-
suming process, we also offer the possibility to turn off en-
cryption of specific inter-cluster traffic. In that case, IP in
IP encapsulation is used. This can be interesting when al-
ready using a secured WAN-technology like for example an
MVNO as suggested in [23]. Finally, when one or both end-
points are behind a NA(P)T box, normal IPSec or IPinIP will
not work anymore and IPSec over UDP or IPinIP over UDP
must be used. We evaluated the impact of these different tun-
neling types on the maximum achievable TCP throughput
and average round-trip-time of ping packets of 1400 bytes
between two VPAN gateway nodes and compared these re-
sults with the values obtained when having direct communi-
cation between the gateway Nodes. This for a lab setup with
100 Mbps links as well as using the commercial Internet ser-
vice providers.
The results are shown in Fig. 9. The results show that
using VPAN with its AES IPSec encryption and decryption
leads to a reduction in the maximum achievable throughput
(≈ −9 % for all scenarios without NAT and −10 % for the
NAT-situation where additional UDP-encapsulation is nec-
essary) and an increase of the average round-trip-time with
≈ 7 % when using the bandwidth-constrained commercial
providers and 80 % and 70 % when using a direct connec-
tion respectively a NAT-box (regular desktop PC with ipta-
bles). Compared to IPSec, IPSec over UDP does not signif-
icantly decrease the throughput, but has mainly an impact
on the round-trip-time. Using IPSec over UDP, a slightly
more time is needed to encapsulate and decapsulate pack-
ets, but no impact on the rate at which packets can be en-
crypted and decrypted is observed. It should be noted that
the achieved throughput is still sufficiently high, making the
impact of encryption unnoticeable when using lower band-
width WAN interfaces (e.g. WLAN, UMTS, broadband ac-
cess...), which will often be the case. Also, with hardware
encryption mechanisms better results could be achieved. Fi-
nally, it is clear that when a node is part of multiple VPANs
at the same time, the maximum available throughput per
VPAN becomes lower since the available bandwidth is shared
by the different VPANs. QoS scheduling between VPANs
could be applied by the node to offer bandwidth guarantees
to specific VPANs.
In our implementation, when 2 VPAN gateway nodes are
behind NA(P)T and no direct tunnel (possibly using hole
punching) can be established, both nodes will establish a
tunnel to the VPAN Agent. Communication between both
nodes will then take place over two concatenated tunnels.
In this case (not shown), throughput significantly drops with
almost 40% mainly due to the time needed for the additional
cryptographic steps and the increased round-trip-time.
6.5 Routing and Tunneling Strategies
The VPAN routing and tunneling framework allows differ-
ent types of intra-cluster and inter-cluster routing and over-
lay establishment strategies. The intra-cluster routing strate-
gies are based on WRP [35] and AODV [38] and exhibit
similar performance that will not be repeated here. More de-
tails can be found in [26].
6.6 Gateway selection
In 5.8, the concept of gateway selection is explained. Of
course, the announcement of all gateways in a cluster can
cause overhead as this is done by sending cluster-wide broad-
cast packets announcing the gateway and its properties. The
time between two announcements can be quite long when
the gateway information stays rather static. When a new
node joins the cluster, all gateways need to broadcast their
information again to inform the new node as well as possi-
bly other nodes in case of a cluster merge enclosing more
nodes.
It can however be interesting to decrease the time be-
tween two packets for a certain gateway, e.g. when using
a load balancing algorithm where nodes spread their traffic
across different gateways and access networks. In that case,
the remaining available bandwidth at the different gateways
must be broadcasted more often into the cluster.
6.7 VPAN dynamics
As VPAN is designed to ease communication in dynamic
environments, by creating a secure overlay where session
12
ISP1−>2 ISP2−>1
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Tunneling throughput: commercial providers
Linux VPAN
configuration
th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (M
bp
s)
100Mbps Direct 100Mbps NAT out 100Mbps NAT in
75000
80000
85000
90000
95000
100000
Tunneling throughput: lab setup
Linux VPAN
configuration
th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (M
bp
s)
ISP1−>2
ISP2−>1
100Mbps Direct
100Mbps NAT out
100Mbps NAT in
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Round Trip Time
Linux VPAN
configuration
RT
T 
(m
s)
Fig. 9 Throughput and round trip time for different tunneling scenario’s
continuity is guaranteed, it is interesting to estimate how the
overlay reacts on certain topology changes. The basic prin-
ciples are already explained in the previous sections.
6.7.1 New links and link break detection
In 6.2.1, the concept of neighbor detection using beacons is
explained and an indication of the speed of establishing new
links is given in 6.2.2. It is also mentioned that these bea-
cons are also used to detect link breaks: when a node did not
receive a beacon from a neighboring node during a certain
time (currently: 3.5 times the beacon interval) it considers
the link as broken. This implies that using the default bea-
con interval of 2 s, it can take up to 7 s for a link break to
be detected2. When this link is used for forwarding packets,
this means we can have 100% packet loss during 7 s before
the route is deleted from the routing table and an alternative
route is selected and used.
Additional triggers can speed up the process: when us-
ing the kernel’s NETLINK events, it takes only 3 ms to
delete a route from the routing table after a cable has been
unplugged. For wireless disconnects, this can not be used.
Additional research is necessary in order to decrease these
timeouts. One can think for example of monitoring the wire-
less retransmissions counter for a sudden increase.
6.7.2 Cluster join, merge and leave
An interesting scenario illustrating the local optimalization
and session continuity in dynamic environments is given in
Fig. 10. Node 3 (generic laptop) has an ongoing session with
Node 2 (generic laptop) while a link between Node 3 and
Node 1 (ALIX-box) is established or removed. Before the
link establishment, Node 3 uses its WAN-interface to reach
Node 2. Upon joining the cluster and link establishment be-
tween Node 3 and Node 1, Node 3 reroutes all traffic over
its PAN-interface and starts using the (probably shorter) path
over Node 1 towards Node 2. Sending a 1 Mbps UDP stream
2 Keep in mind that all parameters, for example the link break time-
out interval, can be adapted in advance resulting in more overhead but
also in a more stable connection
from Node 3 to Node 2, plugging the cable in, out and back
in, results in traffic flows measured and shown in Fig. 11 and
12.
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Fig. 10 Cluster join and leave scenario: Node 3 has an ongoing session
with Node 2 while a link between Node 3 and Node 1 is established or
removed.
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Fig. 11 Measured traffic on the interfaces of Node 3 for the scenario
in Fig. 10.
Thanks to the use of NETLINK events, the plugged ca-
ble is immediately detected and a new link is established
in 513 ms and all traffic is rerouted inside the cluster, as
seen on Fig. 11: WAN-traffic drops to zero while at the same
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Fig. 12 Measured incoming VPAN traffic on Node 2 for the scenario
in Fig. 10.
time PAN-traffic increases till a little bit more than 1 Mbps.
For 1 Mbps of VPAN traffic, WAN-traffic level is higher
than PAN traffic levels as WAN traffic is L3 encapsulated
while PAN-traffic is L2 encapsulated. A peek can be seen
on Fig. 12: there are still some packets traveling over the In-
ternet (or just released from send buffers on interfaces) while
the first intra-cluster packets are already arriving due to the
lower delay.
When we pull out the cable again, this is detected by
the kernel and the VPAN framework is notified through a
NETLINK event resulting in deletion of the route within
13 ms. PAN and WAN lines switch again in Fig. 11 as the
other interface is used now, while traffic drops to zero for
a little while in Fig. 11 as the new route causes extra delay
and some packets may get lost while pulling the cable. After
putting the cable back again and streaming for a few sec-
onds, the experiment is finished resulting in a packet loss of
0.34 % for the whole time. 61 packets out of 5104 arrived
out of order. All these values are averaged over five runs.
Of course, such fast handovers are only possible thanks
to the kernel detection of the cable status and its announce-
ment using NETLINK events. When we connect Node 1 and
Node 3 using a switch, detection only happens at one side of
the switch and thus only at one of both nodes. When putting
in the cable, this is not a problem as at least one node de-
tects this and sends a beacon immediately. While pulling the
cable out however, the other node does not notice the link
break until a timeout occurs while not receiving any beacons
from the other node anymore. This results in a time frame of
≈ 5 s where traffic is being sent but not received at the re-
mote side: 10 s of streaming results in ≈ 60 % packet loss.
Decreasing the beacon interval from 2 s to 200 ms results in
a gap of ≈ 1 s and 5.94 % packet loss over a total time of
10 s at 1 Mbps.
6.7.3 Gateway dynamics
In section 5.8, the concept and features of gateway selec-
tion is explained. In this constellation, three main types of
events can occur that have impact on routing choices: inter-
face changes at the currently used gateway (a better interface
comes available or the currently used interfaces becomes un-
available), a better gateway becomes available or joins the
cluster, and finally the currently used gateway can become
unavailable (e.g. loosing its registration) of leaves the clus-
ter. We’ve put all these events together in one big scenario
as shown in Fig. 13. ISP 1 is the Flemish cable operator Te-
lenet while ISP 2 is the Belgian ADSL provider Belgacom
and ISP 3 is the Belgian research network provider BEL-
NET, where also the VPAN Agent is hosted.
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Fig. 13 One scenario to illustrate all kinds of gateway changes.
Interface changes In this case, we neglect Node 3 and fo-
cus on Node 1. Currently, the UMTS-interface is used, as
the cable to the Internet is unplugged. When plugged in,
an ADSL connection becomes available and is favourized
against the UMTS connection. All traffic gets rerouted over
this interface. Note that this only affects Node 1: all other
nodes might receive a gateway discovery update packet, but
they keep sending to the same node and do not change any-
thing in their internal routing.
In our scenario, the plugged in cable is detected imme-
diately and the old tunnel is deleted after 6 ms. However,
it takes 2734 ms to establish a new tunnel over the newly
installed interface. This is due to the NA(P)T detection pro-
cess. Depending on the used type of NAT, some packets get
not through the NA(P)T box and do not arrive at the gate-
way node so we have to wait for a timeout. This timeout
is configurable in the gateway and has been set to 2500 ms
for this experiment. When streaming at 100 Kbps (because
of the UMTS interface) during 10 s, we loose 24/87 pack-
ets or 28 %, averaged over 5 runs. Future work is neces-
sary in order to immediately start using the available tunnels
(the VPAN Agent tunnel in most cases) and only switch to
another tunnel when this tunnel is established. This should
result in 0 lost packets.
The other way around (unplugging the cable) results in
the same values for this situation, with a faster tunnel setup
(2134 ms) but slower route propagation due to the long delay
over UMTS.
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Gateway joins cluster The impact on an active session, when
a gateway, that is an endpoint of that session, joins the clus-
ter, is demonstrated in section 6.7.2. When the new gateway
however is not an endpoint, it can have an impact on other
sessions as it can be interesting to reroute traffic over this
new gateway if its properties (e.g. monetary cost) are better.
This is demonstrated in Fig. 13 where Node 2 sends traffic to
Node D using the UMTS connection of Node 1 as gateway.
Both cables (Node 1 - ISP 2 and Node 2 - Node 3) are un-
plugged. When we make Node 3 joining Node 2’s cluster by
plugging in the cable, Node 3 is selected as new best gate-
way because of the low cost of its WiFi connection to ISP 1.
For a UDP stream of 200 kbps from Node 2 to Node S, plug-
ging in the cable results in loosing 1 of 172 packets and
1 packet received out of order. Rerouting the stream takes
as long as the link establishment process and receiving the
(immediately triggered) gateway announcement packet of
Node 3 by Node 2.
We repeat this process also with a stream of 1 Mbps
during 20 s marking Node 3’s WiFi-connection as expen-
sive and Node 1’s fixed connection as cheap. UMTS is not
used in this experiment. Results show a loss of 4 packets of
the 1702 sent out ones and 8 packets received out of order.
Detailed throughput measurements can be seen in Fig. 14.
There is no notable throughput drop, but even a throughput
peek right after rerouting traffic towards Node 1. This is due
to the fact that packets are still on there way through the net-
work of ISP 1 and some may still be buffered in the network
interface(s) while the first packets through the new route al-
ready arrive.
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Fig. 14 Measured traffic from Node 2 to Node D for the scenario in
Fig. 10.
Gateway leaves cluster The inverse situation is also inves-
tigated: when Node 3 (which is used as best or cheapest
gateway) leaves the cluster, all traffic from Node S towards
Node Dwill be rerouted over Node 1 again, using the UMTS
connection. For a 200 kbps stream of 10 s, this results in 9
lost packets or a loss rate of 5 %.
When we repeat the same experiment with Node 3 as
expensive gateway and the wired interface of Node 1 as best
interface, we get a loss rate of 1 % or 17 packets out of 1702
from a 1 Mbps UDP stream of 20 s when we disconnect
the cable between Node 1 and Node 2, which is the sender
now. The used ISPs are the same as in the previous para-
graph. However, when we use TCP with the maximum avail-
able bandwidth, we get a throughput evolution as shown in
Fig. 15. There we disconnected and connected the cable be-
tween nodes 2 and 1 a few times. As ISP 2 has a higher
up-link bandwidth than ISP 1, we get a better throughput
when the cable is connected than when it is disconnected.
Notice the fact that no packets get lost and the TCP stream
continues. The peaks are again due to packets that are sent
by the old gateway and were still traveling over the Internet
when the stream was rerouted.
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Fig. 15 Measured traffic from Node 2 to Node D for TCP throughput
maximization of the scenario in Fig. 10.
7 Evaluation and future work
7.1 Mapping the architecture on emergency scenarios
As also proposed by different authors [40,29,30,15,24,37]
and projects [3,2], a wireless mesh network deployed at cri-
sis sites can be a great tool to allow a fast setup of basic
communication infrastructure providing higher bandwidths,
interconnected by other publicly available or dedicated net-
works like TETRA or satellite or 3G. As described in [21],
VPAN allows usage and fast deployment of this mesh net-
work as it takes care of security, mobility and interconnect-
ing remote clusters seamlessly. VPAN can even create this
mesh network itself.
All emergency workers, organized in teams, use their
own VPAN and share the ad hoc deployed and public infras-
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tructure in a secure and shielded way. Certain services (eg.
location-service providing the current GPS-position) are shared
in the VPAN, next to Voice-over-IP (VoIP) services as well
as an emergency management service and GIS-services in-
stalled in the back-end. Some nodes participate in multiple
VPANs. For example team leaders participate in an emer-
gency coordination VPAN as well as their own team VPAN.
Even integration between a VoIP application in the VPAN
and the TETRA voice services is possible as demonstrated
by [2].
Thanks to its session mobility and hierarchical approach,
VPAN allows emergency workers seamless data consulta-
tion while on the way, upon arrival on site, and when switch-
ing underlying communication technologies or choosing other
gateways [20]. Cluster-wide and VPAN-wide broadcast al-
lows bandwidth optimalization when all cluster members
(eg people inside a truck) need to receive the same informa-
tion using a shared or bandwidth-limited up-link like TETRA
or 3G: information is only sent once through the tunnel,
while distributed locally in the cluster.
7.2 Evaluation of the requirements
In this paragraph, our architecture is matched against the re-
quirement summary of section 2:
– Membership configuration and management: this is done
through use of VPAN profiles and certificates that link
members to VPANs. Only member devices with the right
certificate installed, can connect to other members and
the VPAN Agent.
– Ease of use and fast ad hoc deployment: once installed
(which is also easy), the platform acts as middleware and
can operate autonomously without requiring user inter-
action. Once turned on, the software immediately starts
the neighbor detection and registration process allowing
fast deployment.
– Local and distributed operation: thanks to the neighbor
discovery and cluster formation, the VPAN platform can
be used locally, without Internet connection. When an
interconnecting infrastructure is (or comes) available, dis-
tributed operation is possible as registration and tunnel
setup is done automatically.
– Security: access to the network is based on membership,
controlled by the installed certificate. As such, these ap-
plications can only be accessed through the VPAN and
so only by members of that VPAN. Next, all traffic, intra-
cluster as well as inter-cluster, is encrypted.
– Self-organization and mobility management: session con-
tinuity is guaranteed thanks to the use of a private ad-
dressing space with fixed IP-addresses. Neighbor dis-
covery, ad hoc routing and dynamic tunneling allow deal-
ing with topology and access network changes.
– Application support: access to services and applications
can be controlled by configuring them to bind to the cor-
rect IP-addresses in the right VPANs or limiting access
by a firewall. Therefore a service sharing and discov-
ery mechanism is developed allowing to easily give ap-
plications access rights to the selected VPANs in a user
friendly manner. This also works the other way around:
by specifying to which VPAN some applications have
access to, we also control which users have access to
which applications and services running on the remote
devices, based on the VPAN they participate in. Support
for all kinds of applications is guaranteed as the only
requirement at the application level is plain IPv4 com-
patibility. Transition to IPv6 is possible.
– Scalability: cluster scalability is impacted by the number
of interfering beacons (discussed in 6.2.1 and [26]) and
the scalability of the intra-cluster ad hoc routing protocol
(extensively evaluated in literature). For the proactive
routing solution, the hierarchical routing approach en-
sures that nodes in a cluster only need a route to all other
nodes inside the cluster and that gateway nodes only
need to distribute changes in the composition of the clus-
ter between each other, reducing the routing overhead
and improving scalability (see [26]). However, when the
number of clusters or gateways increases, the number
of tunnels will also increase, since a full mesh is being
established in the proactive approach. An approach in-
troducing super-members in order to avoid a full mesh
could then improve this scalability. Alternatively, the re-
active solution could be used to only establish tunnels
and routes when needed (see [26]). The VPAN Agent
can be a bottleneck when all member nodes are gate-
ways behind NAT, so further research is necessary to
provide a distributed Agent functionality. Also the num-
ber of nodes in a VPAN is limited to the number of IP-
addresses in the private addressing subnet used by that
particular VPAN. The number of VPANs that can exist
next to each other is also limited by the number of IP
subnets.
– Heterogeneity:currently, a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation has been built on various operating systems and
hardware platforms. In fact, support for every device or
communication technology with standard L2 and L3 net-
working capabilities should be possible.
7.3 Future work
It is clear that our platform provides an integrated approach
capable of dealing already very well with the requirements
imposed by emergency communications. Of course, the per-
formance results also revealed some possibilities for enhance-
ments and optimizations.
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As already mentioned in section 7.2, a distributed VPAN
Agent must be developed in order to improve scalability.
Also other scalability issues like the limitations of the used
IPv4 subnets must be tackled. Next to this, we already pointed
to a dynamic beacon interval in 6.2.1, which may be im-
plemented using GPS integration on some devices or other
methods.
Next to cluster-wide and VPAN-wide broadcasting, mul-
ticast functionalities in a VPAN are a point of ongoing re-
search. Also better intra-cluster ad hoc routing protocols must
be investigated to take eg. link quality into account and focus
on (TCP) throughput, reliability, load balancing and quality
of service. A lot of literature in this field is already available
[12,16,43] and new protocols are being developed by lots of
research groups around the world.
Intelligent (type of service based) gateway selection is
now only available for outgoing traffic. An extension should
be developed in order to make a better choice as remote gate-
way when there are more gateways in the remote cluster.
Quality of Service in general is a topic where lots of oppor-
tunities for further improvements reside.
Of course, VPAN development should keep phase with
new technologies and platforms. For example a port to the
iPhone and Android platform can bring VPAN to even more
mobile devices as these platforms are growing in popularity.
And last but not least: sensor networking is a hot is-
sue. Integration of sensor networking, by using a Zigbee
coordinator as VPAN-gateway to the sensor network like
in the ITEA2 USENET project [9], or by porting the mini-
mal VPAN functionalities (like neighbor detection and intra
cluster routing) to sensor platforms, are investigated.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the concept of VPANs, a
next-generation communication paradigm that tackles an im-
portant communication need absent in current or future net-
works, especially in emergency and NSPS networks: i.e. the
need for secure communication between a limited number
of local and distributed devices and for a variety of ser-
vices and applications. Through its generality, the concept
is capable to support a wide range of applications. We have
shown that existing technologies are not capable to meet all
challenges involved with this concept and all emergency and
NSPS communication requirements, while the VPAN plat-
form tackles them all, or at least partly regarding scalability.
The VPAN concept has been translated into an architec-
ture and a fully working prototype has been implemented
and extensively evaluated. The functionalities of this pro-
totype are described and performance results are presented.
Results are analyzed offering valuable insight into the per-
formance of the implemented system and providing guide-
lines for future extensions, of which a few are listed above.
We hope that more research can make this powerful con-
cept succeed in the real world, eases communication and add
real value to save lives.
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